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Rethinking the Rural-Urban Divide in 
China’s New Stratification Order
Qian Forrest Zhang* 
Singapore Management University
Abstract 
I use a Marxist framework centred on the mode of production to conceptually 
analyze the changing stratification structure in today’s China with a focus on 
the changing nature of rural-urban inequality. As the state-managed tributary 
mode of production, once dominant under socialism, is being gradually 
eclipsed by the reviving petty-commodity mode of production and the newly 
emerged capitalist mode of production, both of which are market-based and 
enable the transfer of surplus from labour to capital, a new set of mechanisms 
are creating and sustaining rural-urban inequality in China. Rural-urban 
inequality – although still significant in its magnitude – is no longer primarily 
based on the politically created status difference between rural and urban 
household registrations, but more on the newly formed rural-urban division of 
labour in China’s new market economy. I use this perspective to look at how 
market situation – rather than household registration – is shaping the contours 
of rural-urban divide in today’s China in three areas: inequality in rural areas, 
rural-urban disparities, and rural migrants in cities.
Keywords: rural-urban inequality, class stratification, mode of production, 
household registration, rural migrants
JEL classification: J61, N35, P25, Z13
1. Introduction
In this paper, I attempt to use a Marxist framework to conceptually analyze 
the changing stratification structure in today’s China with a focus on the 
changing nature of rural-urban inequality. The gist of my argument is that 
Chinese society today is shifting from a society primarily stratified by 
politically defined social statuses to a hybrid stratification system, in which 
economically based classes are becoming increasingly important units of 
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social stratification. In this new stratification system, rural-urban inequality 
– although still significant in its magnitude – is no longer primarily based on 
the politically created status difference between rural and urban household 
registrations, but based more on the newly formed rural-urban division of 
labour in China’s new market economy. 
The first part of the argument – about China’s transition from a status-
stratified to a class-stratified society – is, of course, not new; as early as in 
1978, Szelenyi (1978) already proposes that as socialist economies make 
the transition from planned to market economy, economic inequality among 
market positions becomes a more significant dimension in the stratification 
system. The entire “market transition” debate in the sociology literature in the 
1990s is also very much centred on the relative importance of market-based 
classes as compared to the politically based statuses that were dominant under 
socialism. In this article, I depart from this literature in two ways. 
First, I focus on the transformation of the mechanisms that are creating 
rural-urban inequality in China. Existing studies have largely eschewed the 
comparison between rural and urban China and the analysis of the creation of 
rural-urban inequality. While there are many works that try to quantitatively 
measure the degree of inequality between rural and urban populations in 
China, to my knowledge, a clear conceptual understanding of how the market 
transition is transforming the mechanisms that create rural-urban inequality 
has not emerged yet. Given the great significance of the rural-urban inequality 
in Chinese society, this lacuna is puzzling. It is probably partly caused 
by the technical difficulties of quantitatively comparing rural and urban 
populations, which would involve two different sets of variables, in studies 
that focus on income generation. On the other hand, however, it also reflects 
an unchallenged assumption held by many researchers that the rural society 
and urban society in China are fundamentally different and incomparable 
and the inequality between the two caste-like sections of the society is still 
sustained, not by market forces, but by a whole set of institutions – including 
those of household registration, social welfare provision, land ownership, job 
allocation, etc. – that were established under socialism but remain effective 
today. I challenge this assumption in this article and argue instead that 
rural-urban inequality in today’s China – just like intra-urban or intra-rural 
inequality – is primarily a result of market forces. 
Second, I explicitly adopt a Marxist approach to propose a framework 
of understanding social stratification structure that can be applied coherently 
to the entire society in today’s China. Most existing studies on the changing 
stratification structure in China focus on the transition – the institutional 
changes and how these changes transformed the rewards to various social 
positions and the inequality between them. I argue that the knowledge 
gained from these existing studies allows us now to more systematically 
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conceptualize the contour of the stratification structure in today’s China. 
For this task, the Marxist approach that focuses on the dominant mode of 
production in the society proves particularly useful. 
Using the Marxist approach centred on the mode of production to analyze 
social stratification in Chinese society is, again, not new. Hill Gates (1996), 
for example, contends that for the past one thousand years, socioeconomic 
hierarchy in Chinese society was primarily structured by two different modes 
of production: the state-managed tributary mode of production (TMP) and 
the lineage-based petty commodity mode of production (PCMP). This paper 
extends Gates’ analysis to contemporary China. It starts with an analysis of 
the dominant modes of production in today’s China and uses this perspective 
to cast new light on how rural-urban inequality is generated in the dominant 
modes of production.
The goal of this study is not to quantitatively measure the increase 
or decrease in the degree of rural-urban inequality, but to conceptually 
understand the nature of rural-urban inequality and the social mechanisms that 
create this inequality. Although this paper does not present much empirical 
investigation, it does suggest empirically testable hypotheses. The conceptual 
framework I adopt here centres on the Marxist concept of mode of production 
– the system of creating, extracting, transferring and distributing economic 
surplus among different social groups. An analysis of the modes of production 
in an economy reveals not only how economic production is carried out, but 
also how inequality is directly created in this process through the extraction 
and transfer of surplus among social groups. As mentioned above, Gates 
(1996), using this perspective in studying stratification in traditional Chinese 
society, portrays the stratification structure in this way: 
For a thousand years in the late-imperial tributary mode, a class of scholar-
officials has transferred surpluses from the various producer classes 
(peasants, petty capitalists, laborers) to themselves by means of direct 
extraction as tribute, taxes, corvee, hereditary labor duties, and the like. In 
the private markets that flourished in China from the Song forward, free 
producers transferred any remaining surpluses among the commoner classes 
by means of wage labor and a hierarchical kinship/gender system.
(Gates, 1996: 7)
These two political-economic systems of organizing production and 
distributing surplus placed Chinese people within their reach into a two-
tiered class structure. Under the TMP, extraction of surplus from producers 
by holders of political power created the most important status divide in the 
traditional society: officials vs. commoners. Within the two great tributary 
classes of officials and commoners – which, to use Max Weber’s terminology, 
should be more strictly called “status groups” – second-tier hierarchies still 
existed.
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The next section brings this perspective to examine the dominant modes 
of production and the stratification structure based on them during the 
socialist era, which created a caste-like rural-urban divide that characterized 
social stratification in socialist China. Following that, I will show how market 
transition changed dominant modes of production in today’s China and 
introduced a new set of mechanisms that generate and maintain rural-urban 
inequality. This conceptual discussion is then followed by a more empirically 
focused examination of various dimensions of rural-urban inequality that 
generates some testable hypotheses. 
2. Rural-Urban Inequality under Socialism
Despite a tumultuous century of confrontation with the outside world and 
internal societal transformation, some form of state and competitive markets 
persisted; the state-managed tributary mode of production and a petty 
commodity mode of production continued to be the two dominant modes of 
production that shaped the stratification structure in Chinese society. The real 
fundamental change to these two modes of production and, subsequently, to 
social stratification, came only after the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949. During the socialist era (1949 to 1978), the reach and strength 
of the TMP reached its apex, whereas the PCMP was suppressed to the point 
of near elimination.
Upon its founding, the socialist regime started social transformation 
in rural areas with the land reform in early 1950s and then pushed for 
collectivization which shifted land ownership and control over production 
from individual households to collective brigades and communes. Collec-
tivization greatly reduced the PCMP, as its material foundation – private land 
– was pulled from underneath it. Both the land reform and collectivization 
also helped to eliminate the landed gentry, the political and economic elite in 
pre-socialist China who gained their privileges from both the PCMP and TMP. 
Social stratification in rural China was effectively flattened – the Chinese 
countryside became a sea of small peasant households under socialism (Parish, 
1984). Political status became a more significant dimension of hierarchy that 
set rural residents apart – in a way that reversed the previous hierarchy in 
rural society. As the communist party drew support and most of its low-
level cadres from the poor peasant class in establishing new grassroots level 
governments in the countryside, the revolutionary state entrusted local power 
– and operation of surplus extraction – to political activists who rose among 
poor peasants. As a class, poor peasants gained not only economically through 
the redistribution of landlords’ properties, but also politically the extractive 
power granted by the new state. 
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A similar social transformation also swept Chinese cities. Private 
properties of urban capitalists were seized by the state and private enterprises 
turned first into public-private joint ventures and then publicly owned 
enterprises. As in rural areas, the PCMP declined, first, because private 
properties were seized; second, for those hold-outs, as more resources began 
to be included in the central-planned redistribution, markets for industrial 
inputs and consumer products both constricted, further squeezing the 
space for the PCMP. The state’s direct control over the increasing number 
of public enterprises strengthened the TMP, allowing the state to extract 
surplus from these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collective-owned 
enterprises (COEs) into the central-planned redistribution of resources for 
investment and consumption. Within the state sector, which dominated both 
the urban economy and labour force, the stratification was primarily based 
on an administrative hierarchy, with various work units assigned to different 
ranks and given different levels of operational autonomy and command 
over resources (Walder, 1992). Thus, similar to rural areas, the political 
hierarchy became the primary dimension of social inequality: the higher one’s 
administrative position was and the more political power one’s employer had, 
the more redistributive power one had and better benefits one received. 
The strengthened TMP erected new hierarchies in its own mould. 
Hierarchies among different social groups based on their standings in the 
tributary mode of production intensified, especially between the rural-urban 
divide. The strengthened TMP increased the state’s extraction of rural surplus, 
which was then invested in urban industries and social services, and created 
the rural-urban divide. To maintain a loyal and productive urban working 
class and also to keep urban consumption at a low level, the state provided 
social services to state workers in cities through the work unit system. In 
rural areas, many social services were also provided, such as basic healthcare 
and immunization, literacy education, public projects such as irrigation 
and road building, and as a result, greatly improved all kinds of human 
development measures. But, because of the inherent urban bias in the state-led 
industrialization model (i.e., transfer of rural surplus into urban investment), 
gaps in living standards between rural and urban areas persisted.
The socioeconomic inequalities between rural and urban areas, although 
created by the state-led industrialization model, had to be maintained by a 
politically defined status hierarchy that the state created between rural and 
urban residents. The existence of wide gaps between rural and urban living 
standards would have created a spontaneous city-bound emigration of rural 
residents, which would have threatened to both reduce surplus created in the 
agricultural sector and divert industrial investment into urban consumption. To 
prevent this and to keep rural producers staying within the reach of TMP, the 
state implemented strict residential control through the Household Registration 
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System (HRS), which separated rural and urban residents into two distinct 
categories of citizens. 
Rural residents, without urban registration, were not only denied of urban 
employment opportunities, but also excluded from the rationed distribution of 
many basic consumption items, ranging from housing to cooking oil, making 
it highly difficult for any unauthorized migrants to survive in cities. Except for 
a few channels of mobility – all managed by the state – that allowed for some 
rural residents to move to and settle in cities, a highly rigid status hierarchy 
based on residential registration separated urban and rural residents.
Although rural-urban inequality is manifested through unequal access 
to economic resources, the mechanism that created it in socialist China was 
political: it was the residential status assigned by the household registration 
system – a political institution created by the socialist state – that both 
restricted rural residents to the state’s extraction of surplus and excluded 
them from the social services and material provision in cities. The rural-
urban divide under socialism was a status divide – in the Weberian sense that 
these were two segregated status groups. It was the politically defined status 
difference between rural and urban residents that then allowed the dominant 
mode of production, the TMP, to transfer surplus from rural to urban areas and 
create rural-urban inequality. This urban-rural divide became a long-lasting 
legacy of the socialist era. 
3. Conceptualizing the Changing Rural-Urban Divide
To what extent the rural-urban divide has weakened and whether rural-
urban inequality has declined or increased are still hotly debated topics. 
Overshadowed by these debates, however, is an important change: the source 
of rural-urban inequality is shifting from political to economic. The household 
registration system that used to create the differential statuses between rural 
and urban residents is, indeed, still in effect. However, its impact on people’s 
life chances and living conditions has been considerably weakened.
The effectiveness of the household registration system in creating and 
maintaining the caste-like rural-urban divide is based on the tributary mode of 
production under socialism and the redistributive allocation of resources and 
opportunities it entailed. During the past three decades of reform, however, 
major changes have taken place in China that transformed the dominant 
modes of production. In the first half of the Reform Era (1978 to present), 
the centrally-planned, redistributive economy had remained in force and the 
dominance of the TMP intact. However, on the margins of the redistributive 
economy and the TMP, markets started to revive and expand. The PCMP, 
which had been suppressed and dormant for at least two decades, re-emerged; a 
new mode of production, the capitalist mode of production (CMP), also rose.
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3.1. Changes in the Mode of Production
Self-employment activities were again allowed in both cities and countryside 
at the beginning of the Reform – although initially limited to hiring no more 
than seven employees (Sabin, 1994) – which started the revival of the PCMP. 
In rural areas, the decollectivization of agriculture, which devolved land use 
rights and control over production from collective communes and brigades to 
individual rural households, restored the household as the unit of production 
and consumption. Although many of these small farming households remained 
subsistence producers – producing for self-consumption – more and more 
were becoming commodity producers who produce both agricultural and 
non-agricultural goods for sale on markets. In the early years of the reform, 
rural residents were still within the reach of the TMP, subjected to the state’s 
extraction of tribute in the form of obligatory grain quotas to be delivered to 
the state. But the floodgate was opened to allow them to engage in market-
oriented petty commodity production – whether diversifying into non-farm 
employment or selling agricultural surplus on markets. Before long, the trickle 
of rural petty-commodity production turned into a gusher, especially in non-
farm production.
The growth of rural non-farm employment took the forms of either 
collective township-and-village enterprises (TVEs) or small family-based 
enterprises. For the first 15 years of the post-socialist transition, the growth 
of TVEs and rural household enterprises became the main force that drove 
China’s rural industrialization and transfer of labour from farming to non-
farming jobs. As a result, the new rural economy resembled the pre-socialist 
formation, where both the TMP and PCMP existed. It also created a new 
dimension in rural social stratification: managers in TVEs, who were usually 
current or former village cadres, and the enterprising families became the new 
economic elite in rural society, accumulating wealth through market-based 
entrepreneurial activities that grew outside the reach of the TMP.
A novel development of the post-socialist era, especially from 1990s 
onwards, is the emergence and rapid rise of a genuine capitalist mode of 
production (CMP) in the economy. The CMP differs from the PCMP that 
had a long tradition in Chinese economy in one crucial aspect: its reliance 
on commoditized labour. A crucial landmark in the rise of the CMP in 
Chinese economy is the legalization of domestic private enterprises through a 
constitutional amendment in 1988, which gave protection to private properties 
and allowed the employment of eight or more employees. As a result, domestic 
private firms started to grow, and joined foreign invested firms, which first 
brought in the CMP, in expanding the CMP in the economy. The growth of 
CMP was further fueled by the privatization of collective rural TVEs and 
urban SOEs in the 1990s. The number of domestic private firms increased 
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sharply and some large-size firms emerged. In recent years, the domestic 
private sector has grown to one-third of the national economy, while foreign-
invested private firms and state firms each takes another one third (Tsui, Bian 
and Cheng, 2006). With this rapid rise of the CMP, the transfer of surplus from 
commoditized labourers to capital owners emerges as a new and increasingly 
powerful process in creating social inequality and forming hierarchies.
Not surprisingly, the resurgence of PCMP and rise of CMP pushed the 
once dominant TMP into a retreat, as the reform opened up new markets and 
shifted more economic activities outside the reach of the TMP. Although 
property reform in the form of privatization of public firms did not start on 
scale until the late 1990s, the dismantling of the central planning system began 
at the outset of the urban reform and proceeded gradually. In the increasingly 
marketized urban economy, the state withdrew its direct tributary extraction 
from an increasing number of non-state firms. Even in state firms, more 
management autonomy and property rights were devolved from governments 
to the firms themselves. Since late 1990s, the accelerated pace of privatization 
in state sectors, especially of smaller-scale SOEs further reduced the scale of 
the state-run economy and restricted the reach of the state-managed TMP.
In recent years, however, after the initial period of retreat, the remaining 
large-scale SOEs, albeit small in number, have experienced a revival and 
helped to ensure that TMP remains a powerful force in the new economic 
system and in shaping social hierarchies. Protected by politically granted 
market monopoly and emboldened by the political power they hold within 
the state system, the remaining large SOEs are able to extract surplus from 
consumers in the form of monopoly rent. The corporate reform implemented 
in these SOEs and their participation in capital, labour and other markets, 
however, still transformed them from the traditional socialist state firms into 
a new breed of state firms. Both the CMP and TMP are at work in these state 
monopoly firms: the state monopoly capital simultaneously extracts surplus 
from workers on the basis of control of means of production in the CMP and 
extracts surplus from consumers in the TMP through monopoly rent created 
and protected by the state’s political power.
In rural areas, the decline of the TMP also went through a period of 
retrenchment, but in recent years, has greatly accelerated. Although the reform 
allowed households to diversify into farm and non-farm productions outside 
the reach of TMP and gradually did away with state imposed mandatory quota 
of production, the intensity of the TMP expanded for a period of time. In the 
1990s, the fiscal reform and the privatization and decline of TVEs severely 
reduced local governments’ revenue sources; local governments had no where 
to turn but to ratchet up their extraction of surplus from rural households. As 
a result, besides the agricultural tax levied by the central government, various 
levels of local governments created a myriad of new types of taxes, levies, 
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charges, and corvee labour to extract surplus from rural residents (Bernstein 
and Lu, 2000). Excessive peasant burdens soon became a nationwide problem 
and led to the rapid deterioration of local governance in rural areas.
This trend was finally reversed when the Hu Jingtao and Wen Jiabao 
administration came into office in 2003. In 2004, the agricultural tax was 
abolished nationwide and, with it, the central state’s direct surplus extraction 
from individual agricultural producers. Furthermore, the central government 
also started a direct subsidy to farmers based on land size. The central 
government also implemented strict restrictions on the type and amount of 
taxes, levies and corvee labour that local governments can impose on rural 
residents. Although implementation varied across regions, the combination 
of these measures helped to curtail the power of the state-managed TMP in 
rural areas. At the same time, the central government also started to establish 
social welfare programmes in rural areas, bringing welfare services that had 
long been available to state employees in the cities finally to rural residents 
as well.
These programmes, such as the cooperative healthcare programme, 
in which rural residents, local government and central government each 
contribute a part to an insurance plan that covers locally based medical 
services for rural residents, of course, still fall far short in both the scope of 
coverage and quality of services provided when compared to urban welfare 
programmes. However, all these changes – termination of tax collection, 
implementation of direct subsidies, and establishment of subsidized welfare 
programmes – represent a fundamental shift in rural-urban relationship in 
China: instead of extracting surplus from rural areas to be invested in urban 
industries and consumers, as done under socialism, the central government 
reversed the surplus transfer and now begins to extract surplus from urban 
areas and fiscally transfer it to rural areas. If under socialism, the surplus 
transfer enabled by the TMP was the main force that created rural-urban 
inequality, then, with the decline of TMP in rural areas and the reversal of 
the surplus transfer, this main force of creating rural-urban inequality all but 
disappeared. Rural-urban inequality, of course, certainly has not vanished 
together with this old mechanism. Then, what is the new force that is creating 
rural-urban inequality in today’s China?
3.2. New Source of Rural-Urban Inequality
I argue that in today’s China, rural-urban inequality is mainly created by the 
surplus transfer within the CMP. While most rural residents specialize in 
agriculture, agriculture per se is not the cause of rural-urban inequality, but 
rather the mode of production in agriculture. Under collectivized agriculture 
in socialism, rural producers contributed labour to production, while land 
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and other means of production were controlled by the collective units; except 
for some marginal products harvested from the small private lots of land 
they retained, rural producers’ income almost consisted exclusively of the 
compensation to their labour, minus the surplus extracted by the state and 
transferred to urban areas. In comparison, urbanites – at least those employed 
in state and collective work units – received not only compensation to their 
labour, but also a share of the surplus transferred from rural producers, in the 
form of both subsidized food prices and access to social services. Therefore, it 
is largely accurate to say that any urban employee was better off economically 
than any rural resident in the same region.
Agricultural production in today’s China, in contrast, is now free from 
TMP, but dominated by PCMP and CMP. Decollectivization returned 
land rights to the hands of rural households; development of labour and 
land markets further allowed rural households to increase their scale of 
production. Many rural producers are thus able to shift from subsistence 
production to market-oriented production of commodity crops. Under this 
PCMP, household producers control their own land and other means of 
production and use household labour to produce commodities for sale at 
market-determined prices. Except for some surplus extracted by oligopolistic 
purchasers (mostly urban capital) of their products through unequal terms of 
trade, these independent commercial farmers in PCMP are not subjected to 
direct surplus extraction by either the state or other urban actors. Compared 
to urban proletarians who sell nothing but their labour to capital, these 
commodity farmers receive not only compensation to their labour – without 
significant extraction of surplus – but also return to their land and other capital 
investment. Economically, they are better off than many urban proletarians.
The CMP is also rising in Chinese agriculture. In capitalist agriculture, 
such as the corporate farms set up by agro-capital and the large family farms 
operated by entrepreneurial farmers, commoditized labour is employed by 
capital in agricultural production. This creates an extraction and transfer of 
surplus from agricultural labourers, who are employed in corporate farms or 
work as “disguised labourers” in contract farming, to capital owners, who are 
mostly located in cities. The entry of agribusiness companies into agriculture 
also brought in the industrialization of agricultural production through the 
increased use of industrially manufactured farm inputs, such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, herbicides, genetically engineered seeds, and farm machines. This 
created another potential channel through which the urban-based industrial 
capital can extract surplus from rural producers through unequal terms of trade 
between industrial and agricultural products.
This new mechanism that creates rural-urban inequality in today’s 
China, although similar in its result, differs from the socialist creation of 
rural-urban inequality in one crucial aspect: instead of transferring surplus 
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and creating inequality between two status groups – as created by the 
politically defined residential status – this new mechanism transfers surplus 
and create inequality between two economic classes created by differing 
market situations: rural labour and urban capital. Although in its concrete 
manifestation, this new mechanism of surplus extraction generally transfers 
surplus from labourers with rural household registration to capital owners 
with urban registration, the difference in residential status between the 
two is, however, inconsequential. This transfer of surplus is not dependent 
on the registration status of the involved parties. In fact, there are many 
labour-hiring, entrepreneurial farm owners who have rural registration but 
accumulated enough wealth from the CMP to mainly live in urbanized areas. 
In sum, surplus is still transferred from rural to urban areas and rural-urban 
inequality continues to be created, mainly because in the new economic 
division of labour under CMP, capital is predominantly located in cities and 
extracts surplus from rural-located labour.
The TMP, which used to be the central mechanism of creating rural-urban 
inequality, now plays an ambiguous role with conflicting effects on rural-
urban inequality. On one hand, fiscal transfer by the central government is 
in fact reversing the earlier trend and reducing rural-urban inequality; on the 
other hand, however, the large, monopolistic SOEs, which are exclusively 
urban based, are also extracting surplus from rural consumers to their urban 
headquarters, aided by their state-protected monopoly power. 
 
4. New Patterns of Rural-Urban Inequality
Under socialism, the dominant mode of production – the TMP – was a 
political creation: the extractive power was based on political power of the 
state, in turning private properties into state properties, in controlling farmers’ 
harvest, in disciplining labour, and in restricting rural residents’ exit from state 
extraction. The hierarchies it created in the society, although had clear social 
and economic consequences, were primarily based on politically defined 
statuses. The society was a status-stratified society and the most important 
hierarchies in society were those based on different politically defined 
statuses: urban vs. rural registration and officials vs. commoners.
In the post-socialist China, both the PCMP and CMP experienced rapid 
rise. In these two modes of production, the extraction of surplus is based 
on economic ownership rather than political power. Even the TMP, which 
remains powerful, now also mixes with and draws on the CMP, in the 
hybrid form of state monopoly capital, in its operation. As a result, both the 
economically based PCMP and CMP and the politically based TMP coexist in 
a hybrid formation. Correspondingly, the stratification structure of the society 
also changes from comprising of primarily politically based status groups to a 
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mixture of status groups and economically determined classes, with the latter 
become increasingly significant. 
In this emerging class structure, the rural-urban divide, which originated 
from a politically defined status differentiation under socialism, becomes 
increasingly blurred, as rural and urban areas are both integrated into the 
expanding market economy. In this section, I use empirical examples to re-
evaluate rural-urban inequality from three aspects. 
4.1. Inequality in Rural Areas
In rural areas, the class-based stratification is gaining ascendance. Under 
socialism, rural stratification used to be based on two factors: access to 
political power and demographic structure of the family. Since the 1980s, 
however, when, first, rural industrialization and then, rural-to-urban migration 
unleashed the massive transfer of labour force from agriculture to non-
agricultural jobs, access to non-farm wage jobs has become the greatest 
source of household income inequality in rural China (Khan and Riskin, 
1998). Families with political connection are still doing better; but most cadre 
families get higher income because they were able to use their political power 
to either secure wage jobs for family members or to venture into private 
entrepreneurship (Walder and Zhao, 2006).
In recent years, class-based stratification even started to emerge among 
agricultural producers. Most studies have found that, up until mid-1990s, 
income from farming is highly equitable among rural households in China 
(Riskin, Zhao and Li, 2001). This is mainly because land was distributed 
within a village in largely egalitarian manners. Another reason is that farming 
in general was not very profitable and could not generate much wealth even 
for families who have more labour and land engaged in farming. But profound 
changes have taken place in Chinese agriculture in recent years. First, the 
exodus of rural labour from agriculture and the ensuing increase in available 
farmland has spurred a spontaneous growth of rural land market that enabled 
the circulation of farmland among producers and allowed larger-scale farming 
to emerge. Second, the rising urban demand for non-grain foods also made 
commercial farming of high-value foods more profitable. As a result, new 
actors – in particular, entrepreneurial farmers and agribusiness companies 
– entered agriculture and started to organize agricultural production on larger 
scales with rented land and hired labour (Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). A 
new hierarchy – one that is determined in this emerging capitalist mode of 
production on the basis of one’s economic position – is transforming what 
used to be a flattened and homogeneous peasantry class into a host of unequal 
class positions (Zhang and Donaldson, 2010).
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In this new rural stratification structure, while political power still matters, 
it only takes effect through gaining more advantageous market positions – for 
example, providing privileged access to off-farm jobs, more land, managerial 
positions, or entrepreneurial opportunities. On the other hand, economic 
disparities between the new social classes in rural areas increased greatly. 
Private wealth and material comforts are no longer limited to cities, but 
are also widely available to the new economic elites in rural areas. The rise 
of these new economic elites in rural areas – including entrepreneurs and 
managers in rural industries and the independent commercial farmers and 
entrepreneurial farm owners in agriculture – makes any analysis of rural-urban 
inequality based on statistical averages nearly meaningless. To simply say 
that rural-urban inequality has increased as a result of the market transition 
is in itself a problematic statement, as both the rural and urban societies are 
heavily stratified. 
4.2. Rural-Urban Disparities
Rural life is still considered by most people in China as undesirable compared 
to urban life. This, however, should not be interpreted as an indication of 
widening rural-urban inequality. The undesirability of rural life has a strong 
cultural dimension: rural areas, rural people, and the rural lifestyle are 
culturally undervalued and even stigmatized in Chinese society, especially 
among the younger generations who grew up inundated with messages from 
TV and Internet glamorizing the cosmopolitan lifestyles. In comparison, 
urbanism as a way of life is culturally valued. This cultural stigmatization 
of all things rural is at least partially rooted in the deep rural-divide and 
severe rural-urban inequality created during the socialist era. This cultural 
differentiation has a pushing effect independent of socioeconomic factors 
that drive many rural residents to migrate to cities, to pursue both expected 
socioeconomic gains and a cultural lifestyle. In other words, the massive 
migration of rural labour to cities, while much of it is indeed economically 
motivated by rural poverty and the greater opportunities for cash income in 
cities, is also partially culturally motivated; using this as a measure of the 
socioeconomic gap between rural and urban areas tends to exaggerate the real 
extent of rural-urban inequality. 
Another commonly used method of comparing rural-urban disparities 
– income analysis – can also be misleading. Much of the consumption in rural 
life is self-produced, rather than purchased on market with cash. Furthermore, 
wealth, especially land rights, is not included in such comparison. Living 
costs in rural areas are also lower. When we include wealth and especially the 
control over means of production into the consideration, we can see that the 
majority of China’s rural population belongs to the petty bourgeoisie class, 
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who owns their own means of production, control the production process, 
and use their own labour in production. While in some rural areas, the limited 
amount and low productivity of land has trapped farming families in poverty, 
in other areas, commercial farmers who have successfully shifted from 
subsistence farming to commodity farming are able to live in relative material 
comfort. Yet, most observers, when commenting on widening rural-urban gap 
in China’s stratification structure, overlooked the fact that this large group of 
petty bourgeoisie in the rural population is in fact the backbone of the “middle 
class” in today’s China and are in comparable socioeconomic positions as 
some of their urban counterparts (such as skilled workers).
 
4.3. Rural Migrants in Cities
The hardship that rural immigrants encounter in cities is often cited as 
evidence to show how the politically created status difference between rural 
and urban residents still shapes their life chances. This argument, however, 
requires closer scrutiny. In recent years, more policies helping the integration 
of rural migrants into cities are implemented across the country, albeit at 
different paces. The rural household registration per se is no longer a barrier 
that stops rural migrants from gaining access to urban services. On the 
contrary, access to urban services is now increasingly based on employment 
– in other words, one’s situation on the labour market. Many services once 
reserved for urban residents with urban registration have been gradually 
opened to all or commercialized. Even schools in some large cities have 
opened their doors to rural migrants and charge them in the same way as 
urban residents. While some jobs still require urban household registration, 
they have become a small minority. 
The hardship and exploitation typically endured by rural migrants 
working in cities is not caused by their rural household registration per se, 
but rather by their occupations and the disadvantaged positions they occupy 
in markets. From this perspective, we can generate two testable hypotheses: 
first, urban residents in unfavourable market situations will not be better off 
than rural migrants in similar situations; and second, rural migrants who are 
in favourable positions in labour and housing markets are better off than urban 
residents in less favourable market positions. 
While I do not have systematic data to test these hypotheses yet, one 
comparison helps to illustrate the point: that between the “ants” and the rural 
landlords in villages-in-the-city. “Villages-in-the-city”, or chengzhongcun 
城中村, refer to rural villages encircled by the expanding city. Residents in 
these villages still have rural registration status – and thanks to that, property 
rights of land and houses located in these urban “villages”. These property 
rights place them in an advantageous economic position as urban landlords 
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and allow them to live in great material comfort on rents and to become 
the envy of many urbanites. On the other side of the equation, many well-
educated urban residents – college graduates in Beijing, for example – find 
themselves in disadvantaged positions in both labour and housing markets. 
Their situation has given rise to a new social phenomenon: the “ants” or yizu 
蚁族, i.e. people who, like ants, struggle in low-paying, unstable jobs and live 
in cramped quarters – oftentimes rental houses located in peri-urban villages 
and villages-in-the-city and owned by “rural” landlords. Clearly, for parties 
involved in this confrontation, the more important divide is not whether one 
has a rural or urban status in the political scheme, but whether one owns a 
property or not in the economic market. This case shows that, when rural 
residents manage to occupy advantageous positions in the economic system 
vis-à-vis urban residents, the urban-rural hierarchy can be reversed, without 
changing the political status that used to define rural and urban statuses.
Many commentators have noted that rural migrants to cities often have to 
go back to their home villages for social reproduction and have used this as 
evidence to show how the politically defined rural status still limits migrants’ 
chances in cities. However, what has been less noticed is that many young 
urban residents also have to delay or even forego their social reproduction 
simply because they do not own a property to house the to-be-formed new 
family. The reason for this has little to do with the political status, but more 
to do with one’s economic condition.
As the institutional barriers erected under socialism to help maintain 
the TMP and transfer of rural surplus into urban industries were gradually 
dismantled, urban lives were no longer dependent on the rationed allocation 
of consumer goods and social services, tied with employment in work 
units and urban registration. In the past three decades, hundreds of millions 
of rural residents have migrated to cities – to either work temporarily or 
settle permanently. These rural migrants are indeed still poorly treated in 
cities, stigmatized by urbanites, and had difficulties in getting good jobs or 
permanently settling down; but these difficulties they encounter in cities, 
which are also faced by urban migrants, are increasingly the result of their 
disadvantaged economic positions in the CMP and PCMP, especially in labour 
and housing markets, and less the result of a politically defined rural status.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
Under socialism, the “rural” status was defined not because of one’s 
occupation in agriculture in the economic division of labour, but because of 
one’s position in a political classification – the household registration system. 
This rural status then simultaneously subjected one to the extraction of surplus 
under the TMP and excluded one from receiving transfer of surplus in the 
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form of all kinds of urban social services. But nowadays, the rural registration 
status no longer has such an effect: rural producers are not only freed from 
the extraction by the central government, but also receive direct transfer of 
surplus in the form of farming subsidy. They can also freely migrate to cities 
and have gained access to many urban services.
Rural areas are still generally poorer than cities, but not because they are 
politically subjected to the tributary extraction by cities, but rather mainly 
because of their specialization in the less profitable agricultural production in 
the economic division of labour, which occupies a peripheral and subordinate 
position to the manufacturing and financial industries in cities. When a rural 
area upgrades its economy from agriculture into manufacturing, as many 
rural villages in peri-urban locations did all over China, but particularly in 
coastal regions, it quickly improves its economic prosperity to a level com-
parable to similar urban areas, without ever changing its politically defined 
“rural” status. 
In rural areas, the strong institutional protection of small farmers’ land 
rights and intrinsic barriers in agriculture against the penetration of capital 
provide stronger foundations for the survival and even growth of petty-
commodity producers in agriculture. In the urban economy, in contrast, 
petty-commodity producers face increasing competition from big capital and 
declining profits in the production process; in the consumption process, they 
also face rising reproduction costs driven by the pursuit of monopoly rents by 
both big capital and the state. Proletarianized urban workers who are exposed 
to the brute forces of markets are in even worse conditions. Compared to 
agricultural petty-commodity producers in rural areas, they may find that the 
social status they enjoy as urban residents, which used to put them in enviable 
positions in the status hierarchy under socialism, now provides little material 
comforts and is dwarfed by the economic disadvantages they confront in their 
low positions in the new class hierarchy.
The re-evaluation of the rural-urban divide in today’s China also prompts 
us to re-think about the nature of rurality in China: What constitute rural? 
Under socialism, what constituted rural in China was mainly defined by 
the politically created status of having rural household registration. Most 
of the rural residents were also engaged in agricultural production, but that 
occupational specialization – although overlapping largely with rural status 
– was not the factor in determining rurality. Some rural residents had the 
chance to work as temporary labour in factories in cities, but they were 
still considered by all – urbanites, the state, and rural residents themselves 
– as “rural people” (nongcunren 农村人), as their politically defined status 
excluded them from access to urban amenities and from settling down 
formally in cities. In some sense, the agricultural occupation was more a 
result of the rural status than a determinant of it. It was the rural household 
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registration that excluded them from cities and urban employment and 
services, restricted rural residents in the agricultural sector, and subjected 
them to surplus extraction and transfer by the state-managed TMP. 
In contrast, in today’s market economy in China, where household 
registration is no longer a barrier that stops rural residents from migrating to 
cities to find jobs and settle down, rurality can no longer be so unambiguously 
defined on political status. Instead, I think it is more sensible now to think of 
rurality as based on a specialization in agriculture in the economic division 
of labour. Rural is the place where the biological process of agricultural 
production is conducted, because of its land-based nature, but this production 
process is increasingly integrated into the chain of industrial production 
controlled by urban capital. Rural areas specialize in natural production in the 
economic division of labour of the industrialized production of foods, which, 
due to its peripheral position to industries and the increasing control by urban 
capital, subjects itself to the surplus extraction by capital based in cities.
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